Well, now that Congressman Paul has officially declared that his fairy tale race for the presidency is over, we can start talking more about the revolution that was, or that wanted to be.
Yes, Mr. Paul has left the building, at least the house of fiction.
I'm going to make this a running post about my thoughts on the Paul campaign. I'll probably invite my brother to do some guest blogging as well. He's the expert on this campaign.
My major criticism of the Paul campaign is in it's leadership. It's clear they never truly took advantage of the fundraising potential Congressman Paul possesed. Had they, they would have raised much more. The funny part is, that it wouldn't have mattered. Everyone who interacted with this group of clowns knows they had no strategy, no direction, and no operational skills whatsoever. So who's to blame for this? There was clearly appeal to Ron Paul's message. We can only blam one person, who ulitimately calls the shots and that's the congressman himself. If Ron Paul was serious about his message, if he was serious about actually competing in any of these states, he would have taken the initiative to hire a staff that could have have led him in a much more strategic direction. Like I said, I'll let my brother chime in on this later, but the fact is, they missed a huge opportunity.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
CRM: The New Little Black Book of Politics ...The Institute for Politics, Democracy, & The Internet
After reading IPDI's CRM: The New Little Black Book of Politics you feel like you've read something tangible. As a campaign staffer, there's a great deal of information which I feel is very applicable to my daily job. When you read through the collection of pieces there's not much you'd see as controversial, but the reality is contrary to the logic.
In all political campaigns divisions exist on a variety of levels. Today, we face a new challenge when developing a strategy to elect a candidate. Over the past ten five years or so a new wave in political campaigning has risen to challenge the old guard of the campaign community. The new guard is one which is more in tune to the technology of mainstream America. They are a group who recognize the new ways which Americans are communicating and the importance of both understanding this communication and taking advantage of it. Many modern campaigns still struggle with the reality that ignoring these communication medians could prove fatal to their candidates chances. It's a battle against the old guard and the new guard and the campaigns which are able to reconcile the differences in mindset may prove to be the most succesful.
There's no doubt in my mind that all of the major presidential campaigns are using CRM technologies. I know for a fact one of them uses a number of systems. One of the major themes in this work is the difference between recognizing the need for such a system and combining the usage of such systems with real world relationship building. The point is reiterated repeatedly that simply purchasing a CRM system will not lead to a winning campaign. There's no doubt some campaigns have been dramatically more successfull in building bridges to their constituencies than have others. The ability to bridge between the old guard and new guard determines what a campaign gets out of their CRM strategy. This requires much of the staff, particularly the senior staff, in setting the standards by which the campaign will operate. A small fissure in this approach can lead to major repercussions. For instance, imagine an individual in charge of an entire region not being on board with the CRM strategy. When it comes time for critical contact, there won't be time for the campaign to reconcile rogue lists or god forbid communication which has failed to be tracked at all.
As someone with a significant amount of on the ground campaign experience, I believe some of the ideas and strategies proposed by these authors, while they would undoubtedly prove effective if achievable, are impractical in both a logistical and a political sense. For instance, the notion of arming field organizers with PDAs which would enable them to do real time data entry is logistically unrealistic. First of all, most FOs wouldn't understant how to use a PDA, their strength is in their verbal communication, not their technical know how. While they could be trained, this represents a huge obstacle to utilizing this level of technology. Also, I think you'd be hard pressed to find a field director who would feel comfortable handing over expensive pieces of electronics to his or her staff in the field. Field staff, while they should be applauded for the amazing hours they put in, are notorious for filth and forgetfullness. Another thing that struck me as unfeasible would be having a computer at an event check in to take people's names and email addresses. While I'm not sure if any campaigns actually do this, I would be skeptical of the idea. It's hard enough to get someone to sign a paper list at an event. People sitting at computers taking information would be both intimidating, and probably seen as intrusive. My solution would be to put more urgency into uploading the data into a CRM in some meaningful way.
These are small criticisms of the piece. Overall I feel this is an indispensable collection of essays which no student studying politics should go without. In fact, I'd argue that campaigns should make this required reading for many departments within their operations.
In all political campaigns divisions exist on a variety of levels. Today, we face a new challenge when developing a strategy to elect a candidate. Over the past ten five years or so a new wave in political campaigning has risen to challenge the old guard of the campaign community. The new guard is one which is more in tune to the technology of mainstream America. They are a group who recognize the new ways which Americans are communicating and the importance of both understanding this communication and taking advantage of it. Many modern campaigns still struggle with the reality that ignoring these communication medians could prove fatal to their candidates chances. It's a battle against the old guard and the new guard and the campaigns which are able to reconcile the differences in mindset may prove to be the most succesful.
There's no doubt in my mind that all of the major presidential campaigns are using CRM technologies. I know for a fact one of them uses a number of systems. One of the major themes in this work is the difference between recognizing the need for such a system and combining the usage of such systems with real world relationship building. The point is reiterated repeatedly that simply purchasing a CRM system will not lead to a winning campaign. There's no doubt some campaigns have been dramatically more successfull in building bridges to their constituencies than have others. The ability to bridge between the old guard and new guard determines what a campaign gets out of their CRM strategy. This requires much of the staff, particularly the senior staff, in setting the standards by which the campaign will operate. A small fissure in this approach can lead to major repercussions. For instance, imagine an individual in charge of an entire region not being on board with the CRM strategy. When it comes time for critical contact, there won't be time for the campaign to reconcile rogue lists or god forbid communication which has failed to be tracked at all.
As someone with a significant amount of on the ground campaign experience, I believe some of the ideas and strategies proposed by these authors, while they would undoubtedly prove effective if achievable, are impractical in both a logistical and a political sense. For instance, the notion of arming field organizers with PDAs which would enable them to do real time data entry is logistically unrealistic. First of all, most FOs wouldn't understant how to use a PDA, their strength is in their verbal communication, not their technical know how. While they could be trained, this represents a huge obstacle to utilizing this level of technology. Also, I think you'd be hard pressed to find a field director who would feel comfortable handing over expensive pieces of electronics to his or her staff in the field. Field staff, while they should be applauded for the amazing hours they put in, are notorious for filth and forgetfullness. Another thing that struck me as unfeasible would be having a computer at an event check in to take people's names and email addresses. While I'm not sure if any campaigns actually do this, I would be skeptical of the idea. It's hard enough to get someone to sign a paper list at an event. People sitting at computers taking information would be both intimidating, and probably seen as intrusive. My solution would be to put more urgency into uploading the data into a CRM in some meaningful way.
These are small criticisms of the piece. Overall I feel this is an indispensable collection of essays which no student studying politics should go without. In fact, I'd argue that campaigns should make this required reading for many departments within their operations.
Wednesday, February 6, 2008
MoveOn's 50 Ways to Love Your Country
Hosting house parties, signing online petitions, and building websites are only a few of the things you can do to grab hold of your latent activism and start working effectively for the causes you believe in. MoveOn's 50 Ways to Love Your Country explains all of these and more, in what can be described as an idiot's guide to twenty first century activism .
The book's strength lies in both it's format and spirit. The MoveOn team has strung together a compilation of real life success stories which focus on using the internet as an organizing tool. The stories seldom take up more than two pages which makes them easy to read and more importantly to understand. To enhance simplicity each story is accompanied by a "MoveOn's Tips" box which highlights the lessons which should be learned.
It's weakness is however overarching. The book fails to identify the true impetus in most of the case studies, which more often than not is the ability of the given citizen to effectively capitalize on the momentum awarded by a successful internet campaign. In many of these stories, the internet campaign sets the framework for the job which must be accomplished. The ultimate success of the campaign is dependent more so on actual creative human interaction taking place, and unfortunately, the MoveOn tips don't frequently address these points. For instance, in the first account of the book the success of the campaign had much more to do with the teams' on the ground efforts than it did with the signatures collected. Admittedly, this is a classic chicken and egg dilemma. Obviously the signatures empower them to go further, but actually printing them and bringing them to the governor, and drawing the press coverage, was perhaps the tipping point in their campaign.
Overall MoveOn should be applauded for bringing so many new faces into a world of activism where they can make a difference. I must so however, that as an active Democrat I've been both impressed and annoyed at MoveOn in the past. While they've brought innovation to political campaigns which has undoubtedly provided enthusiasm for a new brand of activism, they've also focused their strengths against some members of our party. While I consider myself to be a part of the progressive wing of the Democratic party, I also understand the need for the party to appeal more broadly, for the good of the country. I understand MoveOn is user driven, but targeting fellow Democrats is not time will spent. However that's my opinion, and that's another thing that makes this country great.
The book's strength lies in both it's format and spirit. The MoveOn team has strung together a compilation of real life success stories which focus on using the internet as an organizing tool. The stories seldom take up more than two pages which makes them easy to read and more importantly to understand. To enhance simplicity each story is accompanied by a "MoveOn's Tips" box which highlights the lessons which should be learned.
It's weakness is however overarching. The book fails to identify the true impetus in most of the case studies, which more often than not is the ability of the given citizen to effectively capitalize on the momentum awarded by a successful internet campaign. In many of these stories, the internet campaign sets the framework for the job which must be accomplished. The ultimate success of the campaign is dependent more so on actual creative human interaction taking place, and unfortunately, the MoveOn tips don't frequently address these points. For instance, in the first account of the book the success of the campaign had much more to do with the teams' on the ground efforts than it did with the signatures collected. Admittedly, this is a classic chicken and egg dilemma. Obviously the signatures empower them to go further, but actually printing them and bringing them to the governor, and drawing the press coverage, was perhaps the tipping point in their campaign.
Overall MoveOn should be applauded for bringing so many new faces into a world of activism where they can make a difference. I must so however, that as an active Democrat I've been both impressed and annoyed at MoveOn in the past. While they've brought innovation to political campaigns which has undoubtedly provided enthusiasm for a new brand of activism, they've also focused their strengths against some members of our party. While I consider myself to be a part of the progressive wing of the Democratic party, I also understand the need for the party to appeal more broadly, for the good of the country. I understand MoveOn is user driven, but targeting fellow Democrats is not time will spent. However that's my opinion, and that's another thing that makes this country great.
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